In this talk, we focus on the concept of rational behaviour in multi-player games on finite graphs, taking the point of view of a player that has access to the structure of the game but cannot make assumptions on the preferences of the other players. In the qualitative setting, admissible strategies have been shown to fit the rationality requirements, as they coincide with winning strategies when these exist, and enjoy the fundamental property that every strategy is either admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy. However, as soon as there are three or more payoffs, one finds that this fundamental property does not necessarily hold anymore: one may observe chains of strategies that are ordered by dominance and such that no admissible strategy dominates any of them. Thus, to recover a satisfactory rationality notion (still based on dominance), we depart from the single strategy analysis approach and consider instead chains of strategies as families of behaviours. We establish a sufficient criterion for games to enjoy a similar fundamental property, ie, all chains are below some maximal chain, and, as an illustration, we present a class of games where admissibility fails to capture some intuitively rational behaviours, while our chain-based analysis does.
14 June 2018, 10h3012h00
Salle de réunion du bâtiment modulaire BP5 (en bas de la BU), Luminy
25 June 2018